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11 Explaining Miracles: 
Growth Regressions Meet 
the Gang of Four 
William Easterly 
11.1 Introduction 
Like everyone else, economists find success irresistible. The spectacular 
success of the East Asian economies has attracted a huge literature to explain 
the success and to examine the prospects for imitation by others. The leading 
actors in this development drama are the four most successful of the East Asian 
less developed countries (LDCs): Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Tai- 
wan-known by such encomiums as the Gang of Four, the Four Dragons, the 
Four Tigers, the Asian miracles, and the newly industrialized countries (NICs). 
The Four have been used to support each development school’s favorite pre- 
scriptions, ranging from free market outward orientation to aggressive trade in- 
tervention.’ 
It is obvious why the story of the Four is so tantalizing: if only their success 
could be understood and replicated in other LDCs, the development problem 
would be solved. The metaphors for the Four recognize that replication is not 
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1. The case for market-friendly and outward-oriented policies is made by Balassa (1991), 
Krueger (1985, 1990), Thomas and Wang (1993), Chenery (1988), World Bank (1993b). and nu- 
merous others. The case for intervention (“getting prices wrong”) is made in varying degrees by 
Amsden (1989, 1991) and Wade (1989, 1990). Somewhere in the middle are Kihwan and Leip- 
ziger (1992). Pack and Page (1993), Pack and Westphal (1986), Page and Petri (1993), Stiglitz 
(1992). and World Bank (1993a). Other authors stress education (Birdsall and Sabot 1993). stable 
real exchange rates (Kim 1985; Balassa 1978), political stability (Hofheinz and Calder 1982; Hag- 
gard 1989, 1990), low inequality (Krueger 1990; Haggard 1989), macroeconomic stability (Col- 
lins 1990 Nam 1988), foreign investment (Romer 1993; Parry 1988). and Confucian culture 
(Kahn 1979; MacFarquhar 1980). 
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so easy. “Miracles” are unique (the Red Sea was parted once); “tigers” are an 
endangered species. As Lucas (1993) says, “simply advising a society to ‘fol- 
low the Korean model’ is a little like advising an aspiring basketball player to 
‘follow the Michael Jordan model.’ ” 
Nevertheless, economists find it much more appealing to study what the 
successes did right than what failures did wrong: from 1969 to the present 
there have been 717 articles on Singapore in economics journals.2 On the Cen- 
tral African Republic, a country of similar population size but opposite perfor- 
mance, the number of articles over this period was: 1. It is not really clear why 
large positive outliers should contain more information than large negative out- 
liers. 
The alternative to case studies is to examine the entire range of cross- 
sectional variation of performance and policies for evidence on what distin- 
guishes successes from failures. This approach was already well established in 
the development literature (e.g., the large literature on exports and economic 
growth of Balassa 1978, Feder 1983, and others), but has taken on truly mam- 
moth proportions with the advent of the “new growth literature” inspired by 
Romer (1986). Numerous empirical studies have examined the relationships 
between policies and growth predicted by “new” growth models as well as by 
extended “old” growth models. The studies show strong associations between 
country characteristics and growth (e.g., Barro 1991), although these relation- 
ships are very sensitive to the choice of right-hand-side control variables (Le- 
vine and Renelt 1992). 
A natural exercise is to examine to what extent this large empirical literature 
can explain the success of the The Four’s per capita growth rates of 
around 6 percent will be among the largest outliers in any study of growth. 
This is not surprising: the Four Tigers are Tigers because their growth rates 
were high.4 This sample selection problem bedevils the analysis of the Gang 
of Four: we cannot say how special are the Four because they were selected 
because they are special. This paper will examine the place of the Four in 
growth regressions keeping in mind this selection problem. The Four generally 
have large positive residuals in growth regressions, but this paper will argue 
that this is not surprising for observations that were known in advance to be at 
the top of the sample. Growth regressions and, more generally, quantitative 
measures of “policies” are not very successful at picking out the Four as most 
likely to succeed. 
2. These numbers are taken from the number of references generated by a search request for 
the country’s name in EconLit, the CD-ROM index of articles in economics journals, issued by 
the Journal of Economic Literature. 
3. I have benefited from the similar exercise of Barro and Lee (1993) in identifying the best and 
the worst in economic growth. 
4. The others that are ranked as high as the Four are Malta and Japan in the Barro exercise and 
Botswana and Yemen in the Levine-Renelt data. Japan is not in the Gang of Four because it has a 
separate, reverential status; Botswana, Malta, and Yemen are presumably less celebrated because 
they are tiny, not in a coherent region, and/or subject to peculiar circumstances. 
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Table 11.1 A Report Card for the Gang of Four, 196045 (110 observations) 
Indicator Hong Kong Korea Singapore Taiwan 
Per capita growth (1960-85) higher than: 
Fitted value of per capita growth from Barro 
Growth residual from Barro regression higher 
Magnitude of growth residual 
Primary enrollment (1960) higher than: 
Secondary school enrollment (1960) higher 
Share of government consumption in GDP 
Deviation of investment deflator from United 
Revolutions and coups (1960-85) lower than: 
Assassinations per capita (1960-85) lower than: 
Initial per capita income (1960) lower than: 
regression higher than: 
than: 
than: 
(1960-85) lower than: 
States (1960) lower than: 
99 98 100 95 
94 
97 
2.66 
56 
65 
100 
48 
100 
100 
29 
15 
98 
2.91 
58 
71 
61 
16 
19 
36 
13 
99 
99 
3.02 
91 
76 
91 
39 
100 
100 
28 
86 
94 
2.06 
63 
72 
18 
49 
64 
38 
71 
~~ ~~ 
Source: Barro (1991). 
Note: Table gives percentile rankings of Gang of Four for variables in growth regression, where 
100 is the most favorable for growth. 
The second, related issue to be examined is to what extent omitted, country- 
specific fixed factors explain the success of the Dragons. This is the same as 
asking how permanent is the success of the Asian miracles. Cross-country evi- 
dence will show that large positive residuals like those associated with the 
Dragons have historically been transitory. The natural conclusion is that the 
miraculous growth rates of the Dragons are unlikely to continue. 
11.2 The Gang of Four in Growth Regressions 
We examine in this section how the Gang of Four enter into growth regres- 
sions. We take two well-known empirical studies as a point of departure: Barro 
(1991) and Levine and Renelt (1992) (the latter unfortunately omits Taiwan). 
For each regression, we will examine how much the right-hand-side variables 
are successful in predicting the high growth of the Gang of Four. Equivalently, 
we will ask whether the Four were as highly ranked in their policies and other 
country characteristics as they were in their growth rates. 
Table 11,1 shows the ranking of the Four in the right-hand-side variables 
from the Barro (1991) regression. Some of the policy rankings are consider- 
ably less than superlative. All of the Four are in the worst half on a measure of 
price distortion: the deviation of the investment goods price in dollars from the 
U.S. price. Hong Kong and Singapore have highly stable political systems, but 
not so Taiwan and Korea. Primary education is exceptional in Singapore, but 
only slightly above average in the other three. Government consumption is ad- 
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versely high in Taiwan (whose many public enterprises are notorious for 
overstaffing and inefficiency-see Liu 1993). Initial income is low in Korea 
and Taiwan, so that they benefited from the tendency of poor nations to grow 
faster (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992), but Hong Kong and Singapore were 
relatively rich. Altogether, the predicted value of growth from the right-hand- 
side variables is among the highest in the sample for Singapore and Hong 
Kong; Taiwan is less clearly picked out as exceptional, while Korea just barely 
makes the top quartile. To put it more graphically, there were 27 countries that 
were predicted to do better than Korea, including such notable nonsuccesses 
as Guyana, Jamaica, and Uruguay. 
All of the Four Tigers have large positive residuals of 2 or 3 percentage 
points of g r o ~ t h . ~  The positive residuals are unsurprising: observations at the 
upper end of the sample are likely to have positive residuals. To illustrate this, 
suppose that growth had been completely random around a constant term. If 
we had regressed a large sample of such randomly determined growth rates on 
a constant term, then by definition the four largest growth rates would have the 
four largest residuals in such a regression. If we have a model with some pre- 
dictive power, then the countries with the largest growth rates are likely to have 
above-average values both of the predicted value of growth and of the random 
error term.6 
Another way of illustrating how poorly predicted is the growth of the Four in 
this regression is to calculate the probability that a given country will achieve a 
“miracle,” where a miracle is defined as growth greater than 5 percent per 
capita. There were seven such miracles in the Barro data: Japan, Malta, Gabon, 
and the Gang of Four. The probability of reaching such a growth rate is calcu- 
lated as the probability of a sufficiently large realization of the error term such 
that the fitted value of growth plus the error term is greater than 5 percent.’ A 
country with favorable characteristics will need only a small realization of the 
error term to reach “miraculous” growth rates, while a country with highly 
unfavorable characteristics would need an improbably high realization to attain 
a miracle. Again, we see in table 11.2 that the Barro regression is good at 
picking out the success of Japan and Singapore, less so the success of Hong 
Kong and Taiwan, and much less so the miracle of Korea. 
5. The regression is (t-statistics in parentheses): Growth 60-85 = .023 (3.3) -.0000055 (-4.8) 
Initial income 1960 + ,027 (4.87) Primary enrollment 1960 + ,032 (2.80) Secondary enroll- 
ment 1960 - .0035 (- 1.67) Assassinations per capita 60-85 - .0247 (-4.05) Revolutions and 
coups 60-85 -.0688 (-2.66) Government consumption 60-85 -.0063 (- 1.26) Investment 
price deviation 1960. 110 observations, R2 = S02, standard error = ,014. The regression differs 
slightly from that reported in Barro (1991) because the sample is larger. 
6. The lower the predictive power (the lower the RZ) of the growth regression, the larger is the 
expected magnitude and rank of the residual for the countries that have the largest growth rates in 
the sample. The expected value of the residuals of the countries with the largest growth rates is 
always positive for any Rz less than one. 
7. The t-distribution is used for the probability distribution of the residual divided by the stan- 
dard error of the regression. 
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Table 11.2 Probability of Country Attaining a Miracle 
Country Probability (%) 
Most probable 
Japan 59.98 
Singapore 34.62 
Malta 30.95 
Cyprus 29.73 
Greece 27.31 
Guyana 24.45 
Portugal 23.81 
Hong Kong 23.49 
Finland 22.86 
Belgium 20.41 
France 20.24 
Mauritius 18.78 
Jamaica 18.57 
Malaysia 17.07 
Paraguaq 16.90 
Taiwan 16.84 
Ireland 15.60 
Iceland 15.29 
Brazil 14.30 
Barbados 12.61 
Sri Lanka 11.95 
Gabon 11.82 
Spain 11.27 
Austria 11.06 
Netherlands 10.35 
Germany 9.51 
Uruguay 8.98 
Korea 8.80 
Least probable 
Sudan 0.01 
Ethiopia 0.00 
Angola 0.00 
Chad 0.00 
Source: Barro (1991). 
Note: A “miracle” is defined as greater than 5 percent per capita growth, 1960-85. Actual 
“miracles” are shown in boldface. 
Interpreting Korea’s high residual literally is an interesting thought experi- 
ment. According to table 11.2, Korea had only about a 1 in 11 chance of at- 
taining the miraculous growth rates that it in fact attained. There would then 
be nothing special about Korea-it would just be the economy that got lucky 
out of a larger set of countries with good but not great economic policies. 
These odds of a miracle still reflect relatively favorable conditions for growth 
in Korea; by contrast, Chad-with adverse characteristics for growth, to put it 
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Table 11.3 Another Report Card for the Gang of Four 
Indicator Hong Kong Korea Singapore 
Per capita growth (1960-89) (World 
Fitted value from Levine-Renelt 
Residual from Levine-Renelt regression 
Magnitude of growth residual 
InvestmentKDP (1960-89) higher than: 
Population growth (1960-89) lower than: 
Initial income (1960) lower than: 
Secondary enrollment (1960) higher than: 
Bank) higher than: 
regression higher than: 
higher than: 
97 
84 
98 
3.13 
92 
59 
30 
64 
98 
87 
99 
3.23 
80 
65 
63 
70 
99 
99 
92 
1.69 
100 
69 
36 
75 
Source; Levine and Renelt (1992). 
Note: Table gives percentile ranlungs of Gang of Four for variables in growth regressions, where 
100 is the most favorable for growth. 
mildly-had only a 1 in 100,000 chance of attaining “miraculous’’ growth. 
The “luck” view would accord with some of the new theoretical views of 
growth that stress multiple equilibria: countries with very similar characteris- 
tics could have widely divergent outcomes.8 
We could also read the failure of the growth regression to pick out the Gang 
of Four as yet another indictment of cross-sectional growth regressions. As in 
the old growth models, the residual is a measure of our ignorance. We might 
hope that other plausible specifications would drastically reduce the large error 
term. There are, however, two reasons why this is unlikely. One is that, as we 
will see in the next section, the feasible R2 that one can attain with permanent 
country characteristics in cross-sectional regressions is bounded by the high 
time-series instability of growth rates. The other, as we will see now, is that 
other specifications do not appreciably improve our ability to explain cross- 
country variation in general or the Gang of Four in particular. 
The other predetermined specification we examine is the core regression of 
Levine-Renelt (1992), which was found to be reasonably robustag Table 11.3 
shows how the Four (actually the Three, since Taiwan is omitted from the sam- 
ple) rank according to the right-hand-side variables of this regression. The 
8. Among the many examples of models with multiple equilibria: Krugman (1991), Becker, 
Murphy, and Tamura (1990), and Kremer (1993). The development literature has long described 
mechanisms for virtuous and vicious circles. Birdsall and Sabot (1993) use the virtuous circle 
metaphor to describe self-reinforcing processes of rising education, fertility decline, and rapid 
growth in East Asia. 
9. The regression, which is reproduced exactly as in the original source except for scale factors, 
is (?-statistics in parentheses): Per capita growth 60-89 = -.0083 (-0.98) -0.385 (-1.72) 
Population growth 60-89 + .I74 (6.53) InvestmenUGDP 60-89 + ,032 (2.46) Secondary En- 
rollment 1960 -.0035 (-2.52) GDP per capita 1960. 102 observations, R2 = ,463, standard 
error = .0139. 
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Table 11.4 A Final Report Card for the Gang of Four 
Indicator Hong Kong Korea Singapore Taiwan 
War casualties per capita (1960-88; EKPS 1993) 
Government education spendinglGDP higher than: 
Ratio of consolidated public sector investmenUGDP 
(Easterly and Rebelo 1993) higher than: 
Ratio of income earned by top 20 percent to 
income earned by bottom 20 percent (Clarke 
1993) lower than: 
Ratio of trade to GDP (1960-88; Summers and 
Heston 1985 international prices) higher than: 
Ratio of M2 to GDP (1970; King and Levine 1993) 
higher than: 
Average black market premium (1960-89; Fischer 
1993) lower than: 
Central government deficit (Easterly and Rebelo 
1993) lower than: 
Inflation (percentage change in the consumer price 
index, 1970-88) lower than: 
Terms of trade gain weighted as percent of GDP 
(EKPS 1993) higher than: 
Other pe$omance indicators: 
Ratio of private investment to GDP (1960-88; 
Percentage rate of decline in under-five mortality 
Consumption growth per capita (1960-88; World 
lower than: 
Easterly and Rebelo 1993) higher than: 
rates (1965-85; Sen 1993) higher than: 
Bank) higher than: 
100 
16 
3 
51 
98 
n.a. 
100 
n.a. 
14 
13 
98 
95 
98 
100 
75 
23 
17 
43 
64 
49 
71 
42 
39 
92 
81 
92 
100 
41 
52 
65 
99 
93 
77 
91 
95 
5 
91 
93 
90 
100 
45 
72 
87 
n.a. 
n.a. 
99 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
58 
97 
n.a. 
Note: Table gives percentile rankings of Gang of Four for variables in growth regressions, where 
100 is the most favorable for growth. 
most significant difference from the Barro regression is the addition of invest- 
ment, where Singapore and Hong Kong outrank most of the world and Korea 
is also well above average. * O  With investment added, the residual for Singapore 
is much lower than in the Barro regression. This is reminiscent of the results 
of Young (1992) that total factor productivity growth (i.e., growth controlling 
for capital and labor growth) is close to zero in Singapore. Like the Barro 
regression, the Levine-Renelt regression is fairly successful at picking out Sin- 
gapore as most likely to succeed, and less so at picking out Hong Kong and 
Korea. Sixteen countries are predicted to do better than Hong Kong, including 
Jamaica (again) and Suriname. 
To conclude this section, the ranking of the Four Dragons for other variables 
common in growth regressions are considered. Table 11.4 confirms again that 
10. As Levine and Renelt (1992) note, investment is likely to be endogenous and so is less an 
explanation of high growth than a corollary of it. 
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the Four generally had policies and other characteristics more favorable for 
growth than the average, but are by no means as extreme outliers in policies as 
they are in growth. The Four have completely avoided wars over 1960-89, but 
here they are tied with the three-quarters of the sample that was also at peace. 
Government spending on education is low in Hong Kong and unexceptional in 
the other three. Public investment is very different among the Four: very low 
in Hong Kong, below average in Korea, and above average in Taiwan. As fre- 
quently pointed out, inequality is low in the Four and openness is high. The 
financial system is exceptionally deep in Singapore and less so in Korea. The 
black market premium is absent in Taiwan and Hong Kong, but nontrivial in 
Korea and Singapore. Macroeconomic stability is exceptional in Singapore- 
low government deficits, low inflation-but not in Hong Kong or Korea.” In- 
terestingly, the terms of trade changes in Hong Kong and Singapore have been 
among the most unfavorable in the world. 
The last part of table 11.4 shows other performance indicators. Private in- 
vestment (either a result or a cause of growth) is exceptionally high in all of 
the Four except Taiwan. The improvement in social indicators-specifically 
the under-five mortality rate-is among the largest in the sample, with the 
curious exception of Korea. Consumption growth per capita is not as impres- 
sive as overall per capita growth in Korea and Singapore, reflecting again the 
effect of high rates of capital accumulation. The Four’s superiority of perfor- 
mance is not completely robust to other performance indicators. 
While the Four Dragons do not seem to be striking outliers according to the 
right-hand-side variables considered here, there are no doubt other characteris- 
tics where they would be found to be exceptional: such characteristics could 
thus “explain” their high growth. The problem with such explanations is that 
they are too easy to find. It is not that hard to find characteristics that four 
countries have in common, such as a “Confucian work ethic” or high popula- 
tion density. Such ex post “explanations” are of dubious value. The advantage 
of predetermined specifications (like the Barro 1991 and Levine-Renelt 1992) 
is that they were not chosen specifically to explain the Four Dragons. 
Of course, the most obvious trait the Four have in common are that they are 
in the same region: East Asia. The more recent success of other East Asian 
economies like China, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia have added to the 
case for East Asian exceptionalism. However, the selection bias problem may 
be infecting even our regional definitions. Development textbooks written be- 
fore the onset of the “East Asia Miracle” used a regional breakdown of Asia/ 
11. Howsver, macroeconomic instability may be poorly measured by average inflation and aver- 
age government deficits. Analysis of time series of macroeconomic indicators may uncover other 
dimensions of the quality of macromanagement (like the response to shocks), and the Four may 
look more exemplary in such an analysis. Bruno (1993) discusses how, in many non-East Asian 
middle-income developing economies, “the deep crisis of the 1970s (and even more in the 1980s), 
and the delayed adjustment to the external shocks, had and must still keep having a very marked 
effect on long-run growth (40). 
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AfricaLatin America (see, e.g., Kuznets 1966,360-61; Meier 1964,6; Hagen 
1968, 23; Higgins 1959, 10; Enke 1963, 48). The “East Asia” regional defini- 
tion apparently came into use among development economists after the diver- 
gence in growth rates became evident. 
Even if East Asia is a coherent geographic region, there are other coherent 
regional breakdowns that could have been used. The choice of which to use is 
partly endogenous. For example, East and West Africa could be distinguished, 
but usually are not because they are not dramatically different in performance. 
Drawing the boundaries of East Asia is also tricky: Is Myanmar (Burma) in- 
cluded? Is Malaysia? Does economic performance influence where we draw 
the boundary? 
Even if exaggerated by endogenous regional definition, it still seems un- 
likely that the concentration of success in (East?) Asia occurred by chance. It 
is surprising that the literature does not make more of this concentration (other 
than to speculate about cultural or other fixed regional traits supposedly favor- 
able for growth). The alternative explanation to a fixed Asia effect is that suc- 
cess is contagious across borders. DeLong and Summers (1991) tested for- 
mally for spatial correlation of residuals in a growth regression, but failed to 
find any correlation based on physical proximity. However, Chua (1993) pre- 
sents evidence that spillovers exist from countries’ right-hand-side variables 
(particularly investment) to their neighbors’ growth performance. 
Contagion seems like a more likely explanation than a fixed Asia effect, for 
the simple reason that Asia’s success is relatively recent. As the next section 
shows, cross-country evidence suggests that episodes of success are short- 
lived, and so fixed effects like “cultural predisposition to growth” do not fit the 
evidence for either regions or countries. 
11.3 Is the Dragons’ Success Transitory? 
A recent paper (Easterly et al. 1993, henceforth EKPS) found that success 
as measured by rapid growth is surprisingly transitory. The correlation of 
growth rates across successive decades or even longer periods is only about 
0.2 to 0.3, implying that only 20 to 30 percent of cross-country differences in 
growth rates persist from one decade to the next. Figure 11.1 reproduced from 
EKPS, shows least squares per worker growth (from Summers and Heston 
1991) in 1974-88 against growth in 1960-73. The dotted lines show the medi- 
ans in each period. Many countries are in the off-diagonal quadrants: successes 
one period are disappointments the next, and vice versa. The boxes indicate 
the top and bottom deciles in each period. Only four countries are in the top 
decile in both periods: Botswana and three of the Gang of Four. The fourth 
gang member-Hong Kong-just misses out on the top decile in the first pe- 
riod. The Four are notable as consistent performers (with tiny Botswana) in 
the postwar data. 
l7D 
Growth 1960-73 
I NciQ 
PicMz 
I 
I 
I 
JAM 
Fig. 11.1 Per capita growth rates, 1960-73 and 1974-88 
Note: Three-letter World Bank country codes are used (also used in Summers and 
Heston 1991). 
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How unusual is it that four countries would appear in the top decile in two 
successive periods? EKPS show that the correlation coefficient of growth rates 
across periods can be interpreted as the ratio of the permanent cross-sectional 
variance in growth rates to the sum of the cross-sectional variance and the 
time-series variance in growth rates. A correlation coefficient of growth rates 
across periods of 0.33 implies that a third of the total variance of growth rates 
is explained by permanent cross-country differences as opposed to period-to- 
period variation. EKPS show that this also implies a limit to the R2 in pure 
cross-sectional regressions that will be realized with permanent country char- 
acteristics on the right-hand side-persistence of 0.33 implies that the upper 
limit on the R2 is about 0.6 with cross-sectional regressions covering 30 years. 
We perform an illustrative Monte Car10 simulation of the variance structure 
implied by a cross-period correlation of 1/3.12 Twelve out of 50 simulations 
show four or more countries in the top decile across successive periods. While 
not the most likely outcome, it is not all that unusual to find four consistently 
positive outliers even with relatively small permanent differences in cross- 
country performance. 
Like everyone else, the four NICs cannot count on success lasting very long. 
The pattern of low persistence of growth rates suggests that their growth is 
likely to fall in the 1 9 9 0 ~ ' ~  
11.3.1 Before the Miracle: Historical Antecedents for the Four Dragons 
While the success of the Four Dragons now seems to have been written in 
the stars, the Four's promise was not so apparent beforehand. Failure to recog- 
nize the low persistence of growth performance often leads to overestimation 
of the prospects of countries that have been doing well, and the underestima- 
tion of countries doing badly. 
As table 11.5 shows, the performance of Korea and Taiwan-and of other 
Asian miracles-was not so stellar before the miracle. None of the later suc- 
cess stories had exceptional growth over the first part of the century (historical 
growth estimates-which of course should be taken with a grain of salt-are 
from Maddison 1989). 
It is therefore not surprising that most observers before the miracle were 
pessimistic about East Asia. Enke (1963) presents a table of factors favorable 
12. Specifically, we generate a random variable that is the sum of a N(0,l)-the cross-country 
variance-and a N(0,2)-the time-series variance. The realization of the cross-country process 
stays the same between successive periods, while there is a new realization of the N(0,2) each 
period. The correlation coefficient between the two periods will be 1/3. The simulation was for 
120 observations for 100 time periods. We then calculated the number of repeated successes (the 
same observation twice in the upper decile) for 50 independent pairs of time periods. 
13. Other authors also urge caution about the NICs prospects. World Bank (1993a) notes com- 
ing infrastructural bottlenecks and the need for financial sector reforms. Krueger (1990) and Ba- 
lassa and Williamson (1990) argue that continued rapid growth will require greater trade liberal- 
ization. Lehmann (1992) suggests that competition from the next tier of NICs will slow down the 
original Four. Hong (1993) argues that unless tax reforms are instituted in Korea to reduce incen- 
tives for speculation and improve distribution, growth will be slowed by internal conflicts and 
waste of resources. 
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Table 11.5 Before the Miracle: Historical Statistics on Asian Economies, 
1900-50 
Country Per Capita Growth 
Dragons 
South Korea 0.10 
Taiwan 0.40 
Other Asian miracles 
China -0.30 
Indonesia -0.10 
Japan 1 .oo 
Thailand 0.10 
Table 11.6 Ranking of Regions in 1963 According to Factors Favorable or 
Unfavorable for Development 
Rank Per Capita Income Population Pressure Economic Culture 
Most javorable Latin America sub-Sahara Africa Latin America 
Middle East Latin America Middle East 
sub-Sahara Africa Middle East sub-Sahara Africa 
Least favorable Southeast Asia Southeast Asia Southeast Asia 
or unfavorable for development, reproduced here as table 11.6. He ranks four 
developing regions: Latin America, sub-Sahara Africa (sic), Middle East, and 
Southeast Asia. By the latter, he means all of Asia east of the Middle East and 
south of Siberia. 
Southeast Asia was at the bottom of the list in all three of his categories. It 
was the poorest region, which was thought to be unfavorable for growth be- 
cause of the low savings rates (!) of poor countries; it had the highest popula- 
tion pressure; it had the culture most unfavorable for development. The latter 
is particularly interesting given all that has subsequently been written about 
the “Confucian ethic” (Kahn 1979; MacFarquhar 1980). Such an ethic was not 
evident before 1960. An economist in 1952 commented sadly that “the age- 
long influence of the West . . . failed with only few exceptions to instill its 
economic activity and enterprise into the minds and habits of these peoples. 
The Western apparatus of .  . . production remained an . . . indigestible element 
in Southeast Asia . . . the economic energy for a vigorous resurgence [was] 
lacking.” l4 
Nor were the prospects of individual countries clear ex ante. The first World 
Bank mission to Korea in the early 1960s described the development program 
as ludicrously optimistic: “There can be no doubt that this development pro- 
gram [GDP growth of 7.1 percent of 1962-661 far exceeds the potential of 
14. Quoted in Hoselitz (1952,215). 
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the Korean economy. . . . It is inconceivable that exports will rise as much as 
projected.” (In the event, Korean growth was 7.3 percent over that period.) 
Prominent academic economists also did not detect East Asia’s promise. Chen- 
ery and Strout forecast in the early 1960s that growth in India and Pakistan 
over 1962-76 would exceed that of Korea. Rosenstein-Rodan at the same time 
predicted that Sri Lanka would have a higher per capita income than Taiwan 
or Korea by 1976. Hong Kong and Singapore, according to the same predic- 
tions, would be left in the dust by Argentina and Colombia. Myrdal worried 
that Singapore “has its own potentially explosive problems [of rapid popula- 
tion growth], which threatens a mounting unemployment burden.”15 
By contrast, the World Bank’s economic report in 1957 was optimistic about 
the Philippines, which had “achieved a position in the Far East second only to 
Japan. . . . The prospects . . . for sustained long-term growth are good.” An 
even more promising case was Burma, which in 1958 was said by the Bank 
to have “made remarkable economic progress. . . . Burma’s long-run potential 
compares favorably with those of other countries in South East Asia.”I6 (In the 
event, Burma [Myanmar] and the Philippines have been among the few poor 
performers in East Asia.) 
Asia’s prospects looked poor compared to those of Africa, where the World 
Bank’s chief economist in 1967 predicted “the economic future before the end 
of the century can be bright.” He listed seven African countries that “clearly 
have the potential to reach or surpass a 7 percent rate of growth.” All of those 
he listed had negative per capita growth over 1970-88.17 
The postwar doubts about Asia’s prospects echoed earlier doubts about the 
most famous Asian success story, Japan. In the nineteenth century, the first 
Western visitors to Japan held out little hope for the country’s future: “Wealthy 
we do not think it will ever become: the advantages conferred by Nature . . . 
and the love of indolence and pleasure of the people themselves forbid it. . . . 
In this part of the world principles, established and recognized in the West, 
appear to lose whatever virtue and vitality they originally possessed and to 
tend fatally towards weediness and corruption.” l8 
11.3.2 Persistence of the Tigers’ Residuals 
We have seen that the Four Tigers have large positive residuals in growth 
regressions, and that their performance has been consistent since 1960. A way 
of probing deeper into both of these facts is to examine the residuals of the 
Tigers in pooled cross-section, decade regressions, where each country will 
have up to three decade-average observations (for the 1960s, 1970s, and 
1980s). Regressions will again be run using roughly the Barro (1991) and Lev- 
15. The last three predictions are taken from Hicks (1990). 
16. The World Bank quotes, including the preceding one on Korea, are taken from World Bank 
17. Kamarck (1967), quoted in EKF’S. 
18. A quote via Lipton and Sachs (1992,250). 
(1993b. 14-15). 
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ine and Renelt (1992) specifications. We will examine the robustness of the 
results to alternative specifications of the dependent variable: Summers- 
Heston versus World Bank growth rates, and per capita versus per worker GDP 
growth rates. 
The regressions are reported in the appendix. The “Barro” versions regress 
decade-average growth rates on time dummies for the 1960s and 1970s, per 
capita income at the beginning of the decade, primary and secondary enroll- 
ment ratios at the beginning of each decade, the average share of government 
consumption in GDP (decade average), and the decade-average black market 
premium (which is a substitute for Barro’s price distortion variable, since the 
latter is not available separately for decades). The “Barro” regression uses 
Summers and Heston (1991) GDP data for two alternative definitions of the 
dependent variable: least squares per capita growth and least squares per 
worker growth.19 The “Levine-Renelt” regression has as right-hand-side vari- 
ables the investment rate over the decade, secondary enrollment at the begin- 
ning of decade, population growth (or labor force growth when per worker 
growth is the dependent variable), initial per capita income in the decade, and 
decade dummies. The dependent variable is decade-long least squares growth 
for either GDP per capita or GDP per worker, using World Bank GDP data. 
Table 11.7 shows the resulting residuals for the four alternative specifica- 
tions. The residuals stay consistently high and positive in the Levine-Renelt 
regression with per capita growth rates, but somewhat less so in the Barro 
regression with per capita growth rates. The residuals are more unstable when 
per worker instead of per capita growth rates are used: Singapore has residuals 
close to zero for two out of the three decades in both Barro and Levine-Renelt 
per worker regressions. The other three Tigers also have erratic residuals in the 
Barro per worker regression.20 
What is the tendency of residuals to persist for the entire sample? EKE’S 
showed that the low persistence of growth rates is not explained by variations 
in policies or other country characteristics. It follows that the persistence of 
residuals in pooled growth regressions will be low. In the Barro regression 
with per worker growth rates, for example, the cross-decade correlation of the 
residuals is only 0.1 and is statistically insignificant. An equivalent way of 
stating this low persistence is that residuals for all countries will tend to move 
back toward zero (i.e., there is regression to the mean, where the mean by 
construction is zero). With a cross-decade correlation of only 0.1, 1 - 0.1, or 
19. The original Barro (1991) regression used the previous version of Summers and Heston 
(1988). We use the newer one because it goes up to 1988 instead of 1985. 
20. Barro and Lee (1993) also show unstable residuals for the Four Tigers in separate regres- 
sions for 1965-75 and 1975-85, even using per capita growth rates (based on Summers and Heston 
1988-version 4). The particularly low residuals for Singapore in our results are again suggestive 
confirmation for Young’s (1992) conclusion that productivity growth in Singapore was zero. Kim 
and Lau (1993) fail to reject the hypothesis of zero total factor productivity growth for all of the 
NICs except Taiwan. 
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Table 11.7 Growth Residuals of Gang of Four in Pooled Growth Regressions 
Country 1960s 1970s 1980s 
Levine and Renelt (1992) Regression with World 
Bank per Capita Growth Rates 
Hong Kong 2.51 3.98 4.07 
Korea 2.02 3.97 3.75 
Singapore 2.83 2.24 2.06 
Levine and Renelt (1992) Regression with World 
Bank per  Worker Growth Rates 
Hong Kong 1.90 3.35 3.12 
Korea 1.86 3.48 4.71 
Singapore 2.80 0.19 0.45 
Barro (1991) Regression Using Summers-Heston 
Mark V p e r  Capita Growth Rates 
Korea 2.17 2.87 3.62 
Taiwan 1.93 2.33 2.78 
Barro (1991) Regression Using Summers-Heston 
Mark Vper  Worker Growth Rates 
Hong Kong 2.11 1.35 4.28 
Korea 1.28 2.19 2.85 
Singapore -0.43 -0.29 3.85 
Taiwan 2.46 1.20 1.68 
Hong Kong 3.03 2.10 4.44 
Singapore 0.28 2.06 3.45 
90 percent of the residual will tend to disappear in the following period.*’ Fig- 
ure 11.2 shows this as the tendency for the change in the residual from the first 
to the second decade to be inversely related to the residual in the first decade. 
We see in the graph that the Four Tigers fit snugly into the overall pattern: the 
evanescence of the unexplained component of success.22 
The behavior of the Tigers’ residuals (and those of the rest of the sample) 
implies two important conclusions. One is that the residuals are reduced, and 
more of the Tigers’ success explained, with per worker than with per capita 
growth rates. Part of the success was simply due to the labor force growing 
faster than the population (especially notable in Singapore). The second is that 
the residuals in the sample in general are highly unstable and transitory- 
21. If the variance of the residuals is unchanged each period (which appears to be roughly the 
case), then the expected value of the correlation coefficient across decades is the same as that of 
the f3 coefficient from regressing the residual on the lagged residual. The regression of the change 
in the residual on the level of the lagged residual will yield a coefficient of p - 1. 
22. If we use per capita instead of per worker growth rates, then the Four Dragons would be at 
the upper boundary of the downward sloping blob of points in the figure. Using the Levine-Renelt 
residuals does not change the graph or the conclusions. The graph shows the change in decade 
residuals plotted against the lagged decade residual for each country, so that for any given country 
there would be two points: the residual’s change from the 1970s to the 1980s against the residual in 
the 1970s. and the residual’s change from the 1960s to the 1970s against the residual in the 1960s. 
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Fig. 11.2 Change in growth residual in second period against residual 
in first period 
country fixed effects do not seem to be an important part of the explanation of 
the part of growth unexplained by investment, education, price distortions, and 
so forth. The low persistence of the residuals would rule out those unobserv- 
able factors that are relatively fixed over time-like culture, institutions, qual- 
ity of government-as a large part of the explanation of growth  difference^.^^ 
11.4 Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Research 
Nothing in this paper should be taken as denigrating the success of Hong 
Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan. How ever it was achieved, the rapid 
growth of these Four is one of the most remarkable success stories in eco- 
nomic history. 
But what should we make of the fact that a significant part of the Dragons’ 
23. Others have also pointed out that a “Confucian ethic” that has been around for millenia is not 
a terribly convincing explanation for an economic surge beginning after 1960. Cf. Stiglitz (1992). 
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success is unexplained? This paper argues: not much. The Four were selected 
because they were highly successful. If there is any random variation in our 
models at all, then we should not be surprised that the strongest positive out- 
liers in growth have a positive growth residual. The quest to explain the success 
of the Four is bound to be at least partly futile. The literature has often been 
unable to resist the temptation to read too much into East Asia’s success. The 
great success of the Gang of Four does not imply a blanket endorsement of all 
of their policies-they may have made mistakes that were more than offset by 
other good policies and, probably at least in part, by good luck. As in the story 
of the man turning 100 who attributes h s  longevity to generous consumption 
of whiskey, not all of the Dragons’ habits are fit for imitation. 
What are the implications for the Dragons of the low persistence of growth 
rates? It is true that the Four were more consistent good performers than almost 
anyone else in the sample. It is also true that one would expect some small 
number of countries to be consistent good performers even with only a modest 
tendency toward persistence of growth differences. The cross-country evi- 
dence suggests that the stratospheric trajectory of the Four should be heading 
back toward earth soon. 
What may be unusual about the Four’s success is that they were all in one 
region. The spatial association of success with East Asia (even if the category 
“East Asia” is partly endogenous) would imply that more attention should be 
paid to economic geography, as argued by Krugman (1991). The Asian suc- 
cesses look at least casually a lot like growth radiating from poles, with Japan 
followed by the Gang of Four, followed by China, Thailand, Malaysia, and 
Indonesia. Wang and Mody (1993) have shown how there are spillovers from 
Taiwan and Hong Kong to coastal provinces in China. Chua (1993) shows that 
countries benefit from their neighbors’ good policies. It may be that the “some- 
thing extra” in East Asia is partly the mutually beneficial set of spillovers from 
high investment and other favorable country characteristics. But this is in itself 
not sufficient to explain concentration of success-what is also needed is that 
neighbors influence each other to adopt high investment rates or other “good” 
characteristics (or that growth itself spills across borders). While past attempts 
at identifying spatial correlation based on physical proximity have had no suc- 
cess (DeLong and Summers 1991), it may be that more complicated interac- 
tions between countries remain to be studied. 
Another geographic twist is to notice that Singapore and Hong Kong are 
really more like cities than countries. Cities are more subject than countries to 
forces like sectoral shifts from agriculture to industry and externalities from 
migration and urbanization (which would plausibly have strong effects on 
cities’ per capita growth as well as their population growth rates).% One might 
24. See Rauch (1993) and Glaeser et al. (1992) for suggestive evidence of strong externalities 
within cities. Ciccone and Hall (1993) argue that density in itself has a strong productivity effect 
across U.S. states. 
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think accordingly that cities have a higher variance of per capita growth rates 
than do countries, and would be thus more likely to have large positive outliers 
(as well as negative ones). Mean per capita growth rates of all cities may also 
be higher than those of rural areas. It follows that the natural comparators to 
the success of Hong Kong and Singapore would be other cities’ economic 
growth, not growth rates of countries.25 Other city “miracles” could be hidden 
in the data by aggregation within countries. For example, the Anaheim, Cali- 
fornia, metropolitan area (1970 population: 1.4 million) had per capita growth 
of 5.9 percent in the 1950s (when U.S. growth was only 1.2 percent). But 
Anaheim did not thereby enter the lore of economic miracles (Anaheim’s suc- 
cess probably had more to do with the opening of Disneyland in 1955 than 
with “good policies” by the city fathers).26 Data on per capita income growth 
of developing country metropolises are unfortunately hard to come by. 
Finally, when all is said and done, the story of the East Asian successes is 
consistent with the old prosaic fundamentals-investment, education, finan- 
cial depth, low budget deficits. The Four were above average in these areas, 
and regressions do show quantitatively and statistically significant effects of 
policies on growth. This cross-country evidence has at least as much to say 
as the case studies that attempt to decipher the meaning of the Four’s large 
growth residuals. 
Perhaps the best way to think about good policies is that they make success 
likely sooner or later. Policymakers should be convinced by looking at cross- 
country evidence that it is a lot better to make miracles feasible through good 
policy than to make them impossible by bad policy. But the policymakers’ lot 
is not an easy one: it is disturbing how large and transitory is the unexplained 
element in economic success. 
25. I am indebted to Lant Pritchett for making this point. 
26. Anaheim’s per capita growth is from Greenwood (1981, 74), which gives the nominal 
growth in median family income (which of course is not exactly “per capita”-if family size was 
lower in 1960 than 1950, then per capita growth would be higher). I deflate it by U.S. CPI inflation 
for the 1950s (which may overstate Anaheim’s real growth since inflation was probably higher in 
a booming area). 
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Appendix 
Pooled Versions of Barro (1991) and Levine and 
Renelt ( 1  992) Regressions 
Table 11A.1 Levine-Renelt with World Bank per Capita Growth Rates: 
Least Squares (Dependent Variable = GYP; 306 Observations) 
Variable Coefficient 
C 
DUM60 
DUM70 
INV 
SEC 
GPO 
LRGDP 
R2 
Adjusted R2 
S.E. of regression 
Log likelihood 
Mean of dependent variable 
S.D. of dependent variable 
Sum of squared residual 
F-statistic 
Prob (F-statistic) 
0.0123264 
0.0295255 
0.0191983 
0,1492889 
0.0253555 
-0.3279395 
-0.0052455 
0.365726 
0.352998 
0.020685 
0.020583 
0.025716 
0.127934 
0.000000 
756.1182 
28.73422 
Standard 
Error 
0.0 165 139 
0.0032858 
0.0030524 
0.0188816 
0.0094359 
0,1634988 
0.0023868 
&Statistic 
0.7464239 
8.9858686 
6.2896584 
7.9065956 
2.687 1204 
-2.0057602 
-2.1977155 
Wo-Tail 
Significance 
0.4560 
O.oo00 
O . o o 0 0  
O . o o 0 0  
0.0076 
0.0458 
0.0287 
Variables (decades are 1960-69, 1970-79, and 1980-89): 
GYP 
DUM60 
DUM70 
INV 
SEC 
GPO 
LRGDP 
Per capita growth, compound rate by decade (World Bank National Accounts) 
Dummy variable for decade of 1960s = 1, otherwise = 0 
Dummy variable for decade of 1970s = 1, otherwise = 0 
Investment/GDP, average for decade (World Bank National Accounts) 
Secondary school enrollment ratio, beginning of decade (Barro 1991) 
Growth of population, by decade (World Bank Social Indicators) 
Log of income (Summers and Heston 1991), initial year of decade 
Table 11A.2 Levine-Renelt with World Bank per Worker Growth Rates: 
Least Squares (Dependent Variable = LGPW, 296 Observations) 
Variable 
Standard Wo-Tail 
Coefficient Error t-Statistic Significance 
C 
DUM60 
DUM70 
INV 
SEC 
GRLF 
LRGDP 
(continued) 
0.0246784 0.0154730 1.5949396 0.1118 
0.0299728 0.0032674 9.1733685 O . o o 0 0  
0.0154288 0.0029886 5.1624633 O . o o 0 0  
0.1542238 0.0188695 8.173 1867 O . o o 0 0  
0.0220750 0.0086438 2.5538607 0.0112 
-0.4920 195 0.1309579 - 3.75708 16 0.0002 
-0.00664 14 0.00237 10 - 2.80 10763 0.0054 
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Table llA.2 (continued) 
Variable 
Standard W O - T a i l  
Coefficient Error r-Statistic Significance 
R2 
Adjusted RZ 
S.E. of regression 
Log likelihood 
Durbin-Watson 
Mean of dependent variable 
S.D. of dependent variable 
Sum of squared residual 
F-statistic 
Prob (F-statistic) 
0.373 179 
0.360166 
0.020305 
1.914646 
0.017675 
0.025384 
0.1 I9 148 
0.00Oooo 
737.0214 
28.67614 
Variables: 
LGPW 
DUM60 
DUM7O 
INV 
SEC 
GRLF 
LRGDP 
Least squares growth rate by decade, GDP per worker (World Bank National 
Accounts) 
Dummy variable for decade of 1960s = 1, otherwise = 0 
Dummy variable for decade of 1970s = 1, otherwise = 0 
InvestmenKiDP, average for decade (World Bank National Accounts) 
Secondary school enrollment ratio, beginning of decade (Barro 1991) 
Least-squares growth rate of labor force by decade (World Bank Social Indicators) 
Log of income (Summers and Heston 1991), initial year of decade 
Table llA.3 Pooled “Barro” Regression Using per Worker Growth Rates: 
Least Squares (Dependent Variable = SLPW 303 Observations) 
Variable Coefficient 
C 0.1364398 
LGDPPC -0.01 8825 1 
PRIM 0.0001987 
SEC 0.0003837 
SGOV -0.0741 720 
BLCK -0.0297244 
DUM60 0.027 16 13 
DUM70 0.0198466 
R2 
Adjusted R2 
S.E. of regression 
Log likelihood 
Mean of dependent variable 
S.D. of dependent variable 
Sum of squared residual 
F-statistic 
Rob (F-statistic) 
0.363949 
0.348856 
0.024748 
0.017640 
0.030669 
0.180679 
0.00oO00 
694.9134 
24.11416 
Standard 
Error 
0.0209900 
0.003015 I 
6.996E-05 
9.94lE-05 
0.02 194 19 
0.0044487 
0.0039898 
0.0035927 
’Iko-Tail 
t-Statistic Significance 
6.5002292 0.0000 
-6.2436568 O.oo00 
2.8403036 0.0048 
3.8574606 0.0001 
-3.3803750 O.Ooo8 
-6.6816356 0.0000 
6.8076529 0.0000 
5.5241248 0.0000 
Table l lA.3  (continued) 
Variables. 
SLPW 
LGDPPC 
PRIM 
SEC 
SGOV 
BLCK 
DUM60 
DUM7O 
Summers and Heston (1991) least squares growth per worker, decade average 
Log of initial per capita income, beginning of decade (Summers and Heston 1991) 
Primary enrollment, beginning of decade (World Bank) 
Secondary enrollment, beginning of decade (World Bank) 
Share of government consumption in GDP (Summers and Heston 1991) 
Black market premium, average over decade (Levine and Renelt 1992; World Bank) 
Dummy variable for decade of 1960s = 1, otherwise = 0 
Dummy variable for decade of 1970s = 1, otherwise = 0 
Table l lA.4 Pooled “Barro” Regression Using per Capita Growth Rates: 
Least Squares (Dependent Variable = LSPC; 283 Observations) 
Variable 
Standard 
Coefficient Error ?-Statistic 
C 
LGDPPC 
PRIM 
SEC 
SGOV 
BLCK 
DUM60 
DUM70 
R* 
Adjusted R2 
S.E. of regression 
Log likelihood 
Mean of dependent variable 
S.D. of dependent variable 
Sum of squared residual 
F-statistic 
Prob (F-statistic) 
0.1015 168 
-0.0 155429 
0.0002455 
0.0004337 
-0.0488336 
-0.0388459 
0.0278901 
0.0232782 
0.435391 
0.421019 
0.022256 
0.01 8928 
0.029249 
0.136213 
0.000000 
679.3560 
30.29465 
0.0197857 
0.0028198 
6.469E-05 
9.322E-05 
0.0204781 
0.0048094 
0.0037380 
0.0033872 
5.1308283 
-5.5 11995 1 
3.7955829 
4.6527473 
-2.3846737 
- 8.077 1068 
7.4611895 
6.8724279 
rno- rn l  
Significance 
O.oo00 
0.0000 
0.0002 
O . o o 0 0  
0.0178 
0.0000 
O . o o 0 0  
0.0000 
Variables: 
LSPC 
LGDPPC 
PRIM 
SEC 
SGOV 
BLCK 
DUM60 
DUM7O 
Per capita growth rate, least squares by decade (Summers and Heston 1991) 
Log of initial per capita income, beginning of decade (Summers and Heston 1991) 
Primary enrollment, beginning of decade (World Bank) 
Secondary enrollment, beginning of decade (World Bank) 
Share of government consumption in GDP (Summers and Heston 1991) 
Black market premium, average over decade (Levine and Renelt 1992; World Bank) 
Dummy variable for decade of 1960s = 1, otherwise = 0 
Dummy variable for decade of 1970s = 1, otherwise = 0 
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COIllment Takatoshi Ito 
Easterly has done a good job in drawing our attention to the remarkable Asian 
growth experiences in the large-scale, cross-country growth regressions. He 
handles data well and his presentation is clear, and we learn a lot from his 
paper. Although I will differ in my interpretation of the findings, Easterly’s 
regressions provide us a good overview of East Asian experiences in the mod- 
em literature on growth. His regressions highlight how exceptional the Asian 
growth experiences have been compared to the world standard. Can they be 
explained by economic conditions and economic logic-maybe a fast catch up 
with a low starting point-or by random elements? This is the challenge pre- 
sented to us by Easterly’s findings. 
My comments are directed both to the interpretation of Easterly’s findings 
and to the promising literature of growth convergence in general. 
How Do We Take Solow’s Residual? 
In the original growth accounting literature, Solow’s residuals were an em 
barrassment, in that they represented portions of growth that the model could 
not explain. Models became sophisticated to account for technological changes 
embodied in capital or in labor, but still some residuals were present, which 
was taken to be a failure of modeling. 
In the more recent interpretation of total factor productivity (TFP), what 
used to be Solow’s residuals became something wonderful, in that they re- 
present a country’s “miracle,” possibly due to increasing returns. When 
Alwyn Young concluded that Singapore overinvested in capital and switched 
technologies too quickly, one of his supporting pieces of evidence was a 
low TFP. 
Now we have Easterly who tells us that it is all but natural for miracle coun- 
tries to have large positive residuals in growth regressions. He argues that “ob- 
servations at one extreme of the sample are the most likely to have large residu- 
als.” Winners should all have the lucky components. 
I still think that residuals are residuals. Large residuals show a failure of the 
assumptions (such as constant returns) that underlie the regression. This may 
be “suggestive” of an alternative (such as increasing returns), but does not 
positively identify the reason. 
Takatoshi It0 is professor of economics at Hitotsubashi University, visiting professor at Harvard 
University, and a research associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
The author is indebted to Anne 0. Krueger and David Weil for their helpful comments on an 
earlier version of these comments. 
1. If the unit of man-hours for “labor input” produces large residuals, then an econometrician 
may want to improve the labor input variable by including “education,” “years of experience,” 
etc., to take into account the quality of labor. Large residuals should not stop one from thinking 
of alternatives. 
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What Is Convergence? 
It is quite popular these days to run time-series andlor cross-country regres- 
sions attempting to prove that low-income countries grow faster than high- 
income countries. This is called a growth regression, or a regression to prove 
convergence. 
Suppose that technological change is Harrod neutral, that is, technological 
progress is labor augmenting. It is well known (from the literature in the 1960s) 
that Harrod-neutral technological change produces a steady state where YIL 
and KIL increase at the same rate, while YILH and KILH stay constant (where 
Y denotes income, L natural units of labor, K capital, and H human capital). 
However, if initial conditions are not at the steady state, then the economy 
moves toward a steady state (given that a stability condition such as the Inada 
condition is met). 
If capital is below its steady state level at the start (i.e,, right after the revolu- 
tion or war, or the first year of observation for an econometrician), then one 
might expect that the growth rate is higher when the country is underdevel- 
oped, catching up to the world standard. For example, Japan grew at an average 
annual rate exceeding 10 percent from 1955 to 1973, while its average annual 
growth rate dropped below 5 percent after 1974. This can be interpreted as the 
result that Japan did “catch up.” 
Let me illustrate this point by some figures. Figure llC.l, panel (a) is 
a standard growth figure showing the relationship between k (=K/HL) and y 
(=YlHL), linearized at the steady state, (k*, y*). Various countries (or different 
years of the same country) are shown as dots on this line, with growth veloci- 
ties corresponding to the lengths of arrows. Assume the same Harrod-neutral 
production function with the same steady saving rate (and thus the same steady 
state levels) and the precise measurement of K, L, H, and E The theory predicts 
that a state with low y is associated with a long arrow, a high growth rate 
(dyly), and a state with high y is associated with a short arrow, a low growth 
rate (dyly). This is shown in figure llC.l, panel (b). 
Now the same line is shown in figure llC.2, where the vertical and hori- 
zontal axes have been switched. 
If the theory is right and all assumptions are true, we will find countries on 
the solid line in figure llC.l (b), or figure llC.2. Of course, there are shocks 
to the production function, and thus to the growth rates. Then we will have 
scatter dots around the line. Vertical deviations from the solid line are “residu- 
als” in the growth regressions. 
Now Easterly’s argument, or the theory of lucky growth, is that, after rank- 
ing countries by “actual” growth (dyly), we find that the top-growth countries 
are countries with large residuals (vertical deviations from the line). As shown 
in figure llC.2, the states with the highest growth rates (circled dots) have 
large positive “residuals”; in fact, two of them have the largest residuals in 
the sample. 
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U +AY 
Fig. l lC.l  Relations between capital, income, and growth 
Note: Ay = per capita growth rate; k* = steady state capital per capita; y* = steady 
state income per capita; k = capital per capita; y = income per capita. 
But notice three factors, all now clear from figure llC.2, that contribute to 
the “lucky growth theory.” First, the order in growth rates would be exactly 
the order of residuals, if the solid line were flat. In general, the flatter the slope 
is, the more correlated are the rankings of growth rates and residuals, given the 
vertical scatters of dots (given y )  around the line. Second, if dots are widely 
scattered given y, then the ranking correlation is more likely to hold. In other 
words, a high correlation of rankings is equivalent to low R2, of course. Third, 
even in 1950s and 1960s, the Four Tigers were not among the least developed 
countries (LDCs), the left-most countries on the horizontal axis in figure 
11c.2. 
In sum, the theory of lucky growth, as argued by Easterly, is a confession of 
a (apparent) low correlation between y and dyly, and low R2. I do not consider 
it a “natural” outcome of regression analysis. 
In the following, I will elaborate on these observations and present an alter- 
native way of thinking about the growth experiences represented in Easterly’s 
findings. In the next section, I will give a reason why the slope coefficient 
may have a downward bias. In the following section, I will argue that growth 
experience may be a “nonlinear” process, citing the traditional development lit- 
erature. 
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Fig. llC.2 Growth versus level of income 
Nore: Each dot represents a hypothetical country’s level of income and growth rate. 
Circled dots represent the Four Tigers 
Permanent Growth Theory 
The catch-up story of the preceding section is more likely to hold as a long- 
run relationship, while business cycles and other transitory disturbances affect 
both growth rates and the level of income in the short run. In other words, the 
true relationship between the level of income y and the growth rate g (= dy/y) 
is in their permanent components, yp,  and gp:  
yp = b * gp, 
while what is observed is a combination of a permanent component and a tran- 
sitory component: 
Y = yP + e y ,  
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g = gp + eg, 
where ey and eg are “transitory” components and are assumed to be uncorre- 
lated. Then a regression of g on y, such as 
g = a + b*y + e,  
would produce a case of “errors in variables.” The estimated coefficient of b 
would be biased downward. This is a straightforward application of the perma- 
nent income hypothesis of Milton Friedman. 
Since the estimated b is biased downward, there would be apparently less 
correlation between y and g, leading to a case of “lucky growth” as explained 
in the preceding section. 
One might rebut the above reason for caution, however. The income level 
used on the right-hand side of the regression is usually an average of several 
years, so that the “transitory” component of y is smoothed out. Moreover, the 
business cycle in one country (e,) is relatively small compared to the cross- 
country differences in yp. 
Growth versus Development 
We were taught in the 1960s that growth theory and development theory are 
to be distinguished. Growth theory is applicable to advanced countries where 
quantitative changes are the issue, while development theory is intended to 
describe or to explain the qualitative change from an underdeveloped state to 
an industrialized state. Development theory describes the change from an 
agrarian society to a modem economy through industrial revolution. Compo- 
nents of exports and imports change as industrialization proceeds. Fertility and 
mortality rates change dramatically. Savings rates also increase as growth rates 
accelerate. Education level will rise as less youth are needed in the production 
of subsistence food. In fact, there is some crucial point in the progress from a 
low-growth equilibrium (poverty cycle) to a speed-up in the growth rate. Con- 
cepts such as modern economic growth (MEG) proposed and studied by Kuz- 
nets and “big push” and “take off” by Rostow suggest a nonlinear relationship 
between y and g, where a crucial jump in g plays an important role in catching 
up. I will take these observations of the old development theory seriously. 
The multiple equilibria case in growth theory can be depicted in figure 
llC.3, where the production function does not satisfy a condition for unique- 
ness of equilibrium. In figure llC.3, two economies, one high-saving and one 
low-saving, are depicted: k* is the high-income equilibrium in the low-saving 
economy; k** is the low-income equilibrium in the low-saving economy; kc is 
a critical point for convergence, in the sense that any historical starting point 
below (above) kc will eventually converge to k* (k**); k” is the equilibrium for 
the high-saving economy. There are two locally stable equilibria, one with high 
income and one with low income, if the saving rate is relatively low. However, 
if the saving rate becomes higher, the low-income equilibrium disappears, and 
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Fig. llC.3 Multiple equilibria 
Note: s1 = low saving rate case; sh = high saving rate case; k* = high equilibrium 
(steady state) with sl; k** = low equilibrium (steady state) with sl; kh = unique 
equilibrium with sh. 
the country will eventually converge to a high-income equilibrium. Suppose 
that some country, initially low income, succeeds in raising its saving rate, so 
that it leaves the low-income equilibrium state and “catches up” to the high- 
income state. Then we will observe three kinds of countries: high-income 
countries, low-income countries, and those in the process of catching up from 
a low equilibrium to a high equilibrium. Note that the small change in the 
saving rate can result in a large change in this framework.2 
The economy breaks off from an old low equilibrium and moves to the re- 
2. I am indebted to David Weil for the discussion in this section. Alternatively, I can illustrate 
the phenomenon of “a small change producing large results’’ with a uniform saving rate alone 
(without a high saving rate curve) in fig. llC.3. Suppose that the capital-labor ratio (or income) 
level is subject to “disturbances” or “transitoly shocks.” Then some low-income countries may 
exit the boundary of the poverty cycle (the field of attraction to the low equilibrium) and start 
moving up to a high equilibrium. 
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gion of high equilibrium when some fortuitous shock arrives, such as political 
stability, an increase in domestic saving, or an increase in food production, and 
moves it out of the low-income equilibrium. 
If some low-income countries “take off” from a low equilibrium, then they 
start to catch up with high-income countries by accelerating growth. Latecom- 
ers like Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong move toward a high 
equilibrium, or toward joining an advanced nation club, such as the OECD. 
This is depicted in figure llC.4. This observation is consistent with Easterly’s 
claim that “rapid growth is surprisingly transitory.” 
Now suppose we run a growth regression (growth rate on the level of in- 
come) mixing countries near a high equilibrium, those near a low equilibrium, 
and those in the process of catching up. Although countries near an equilib- 
rium will show convergence to that equilibrium, mixing countries near two 
different equilibria would make the point estimate biased toward zero and 
make the standard error of coefficient large. Countries in transition from a low 
equilibrium to a high equilibrium will have large residuals. 
Summary 
I first pointed out that Easterly’s “theory of lucky growth” amounts to saying 
that the growth regressions have low R2. Low R2 values mean that the coeffi- 
high-income 3 
take-off 
low-income 3 
time 
Fig. llC.4 Model of nonlinear growth 
Note: Figure shows conceptual paths of countries’ income. 
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cient on the income level is close to zero, and the variance in growth rates 
is large. 
I cited two different reasons why the coefficient on the income level may 
apparently be close to zero. Put differently, the coefficient is biased downward 
in the regression. First, downward bias will occur when there are measurement 
errors in income as well as in the growth rate. Second, if there are multiple 
equilibria and if there are some countries in transition from a low-income equi- 
librium to a high-income equilibrium, a regression with heterogeneous sample 
countries will result in the downward biased coefficient. 
These comments are meant to be taken as constructive suggestions to im- 
prove the specification of growth regression in the future. 
Comment T. N. Srinivasan 
I enjoyed reading Easterly’s paper, particularly his sarcasm about our profes- 
sion’s amazing ability to read confirmation of mutually contradictory explana- 
tions or hypotheses from the same data! He is right in saying that we tend to 
pay less attention to learning from development disasters (e.g., the Central Af- 
rican Republic) than from development miracles (e.g., Singapore). But, on the 
other hand, the former prime minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, is a far 
more interesting personality, with his economic philosophy and ideas on who 
should marry whom and how many children the couple should have, than the 
former emperor Bokassa of the Central African Republic ever was, with his 
penchant for an expensive coronation and gifts of diamonds to the French pres- 
ident, Giscard d’Estaing. No wonder that since 1969 there have been 717 ar- 
ticles in the economics journals on Singapore, compared to only one on the 
Central African Republic! Easterly is right that we should pay as much atten- 
tion to the dogs that did not bark as to the tigers that roar. 
Easterly asserts that because the Gang of Four were outliers (i.e., in the top 
1 percent) of the marginal distribution of growth rates, they must also be out- 
liers in the distribution of residuals from a regression explaining growth rates. 
Of course, if the regression has no explanatory power, this would be true. But, 
if it has significant power, it is possible that it explains very well the spectacular 
growth performance of the outliers so that their residuals are in no sense out- 
liers and could even be zero. On the other hand, a country which is not an 
outlier in the marginal distribution of growth rates might still be an outlier in 
the distribution of residuals. That is, its growth rate might be too high (or too 
low for that matter) relative to that explained by the regression. However, one 
must also be very careful in using an appropriate statistical tool, such as toler- 
ance (as contrasted with confidence) intervals, in detecting outliers in a distri- 
bution of residuals. 
T. N. Srinivasan is professor of economics at Yale University. 
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Easterly is not quite correct in equating the performance of the explanatory 
variables in predicting the growth rates of the Gang of Four with the expecta- 
tion that they must also be outliers in the distribution of each of the important 
explanatory variables. Since different explanatory variables could substitute 
for each other in explaining growth performance, a country need not be in the 
top 1 percent of the distribution of any of the explanatory variables for it to be 
in the top 1 percent of the distribution of expected growth rates from the regres- 
sion or of the marginal distribution of actual growth rates. 
Easterly sensibly raises the issue of persistence of growth performance over 
time. In analogy with biostatistics in which a common genetic component and 
an idiosyncratic component are attributed to siblings, one can write the ob- 
served growth rate g, of country i in period t as the sum of a country-specific 
effect gi, a time-specific effect g, (possibly that of common external shocks, 
such as oil shocks affecting all countries), and a residual uir. If g i ,  g,, and uit are 
uncorrelated, then the variance u2 of g, is the sum of the variances u: of gi, 
ug of g,, and a: of ui,. Now, if the u ,  are serially uncorrelated, then the correla- 
tion between g, and g+, is easily seen to be the proportion a:/(a7+ a: + u:). 
This correlation, known as the intraclass correlation, measures the contribution 
of persistence in growth of countries over time. Thus, if the variance in g, and 
ui, are small relative to that in gi, then there will be strong persistence. Thus, in 
analogy with biostatistics, the genetic component explains most of the varia- 
tion among the performance of the offspring of different families. I do not 
know whether Easterly is among those who attribute the stellar performance 
of the Gang of Four to their common “genetic” endowment, namely, their Con- 
fucian heritage. I am afraid, like the use of a “dummy” (or should I say 
“dumb”) variable for the Gang of Four, Confucian heritage attribution is mere 
labeling (without even the saving grace of quantification in terms of the coef- 
ficient of a Gang of Four dummy!) without any policy or scientific signifi- 
cance. 
Let me conclude by saying that Easterly is unduly harsh in holding the pre- 
dictions of an earlier generation of economists to the piercing light of hind- 
sight. After all, like all rational persons, they made their best predictions given 
their models (i.e., the economic theory then available) and the information 
available to them. Of course, if either the models were wrong in some respects 
or the information then available was incomplete and inaccurate, predictions 
would prove wrong as well. I am not entirely convinced that we now have a 
better theory of development, but we certainly have lots more data about the 
past, though not all of it is necessarily reliable. For example, if the early devel- 
opment economists had known that, contrary to the experience of the interwar 
period, world trade would grow at unprecedented rates, their enthusiasm for 
inward orientation and, hence, their confidence in the development prospects 
of economies with large internal markets and natural resources would have 
been muted. Put another way, one can and should criticize, as I am fond of 
doing, the present generation for ignoring the past, but not the past generation 
for ignoring the future! 
